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Operational Technology & Industrial Control System SecurityPoultryMar 29th, 2026 · 5 min read

Legacy Control Systems in Food Manufacturing

The Hidden Cybersecurity Risk Behind Reliable Operations

Steve Mustard
President & CEO

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Walk into almost any food manufacturing plant, and you will find a mix of technologies spanning decades. Modern analytics platforms and cloud-connected dashboards may sit alongside control systems installed 20 or even 30 years ago.

These legacy control systems are not there by accident. They often represent stable, proven, and well-understood equipment that continues to perform reliably. In an industry where uptime, safety, and consistency are critical, replacing functioning systems simply because they are old is rarely a priority.

However, while legacy systems may be operationally reliable, they present significant cybersecurity challenges that are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.

Why Legacy Systems Persist

Food manufacturing is a capital-intensive industry. Processing lines, packaging systems, and refrigeration infrastructure are designed to operate for decades. Legacy control systems remain in place for several reasons:

  • High replacement costs for equipment and integration
  • Production risk associated with system upgrades
  • Limited downtime windows for implementation
  • Validation requirements tied to food safety and regulatory compliance
  • Deep operational familiarity among plant personnel

In many cases, if a system is “working,” there is little incentive to change it. From an operational perspective, this makes sense. From a cybersecurity perspective, it creates risk.

The Cybersecurity Challenge of Legacy Systems

Legacy industrial control systems were not designed with modern cybersecurity threats in mind. Many were built for environments that assumed:

  • physical isolation from external networks
  • trusted users within the facility
  • minimal need for authentication or encryption

Today, those assumptions no longer hold. Food manufacturing environments are now connected to corporate IT systems, accessible via remote support, integrated with cloud platforms, and part of broader supply chain ecosystems. This shift exposes legacy systems to risks they were never designed to withstand.

Common Vulnerabilities in Legacy Control Systems

  • Lack of Authentication and Access Control - Many older systems rely on shared credentials or, in some cases, no authentication at all. This makes it difficult to restrict access based on roles, track who made changes, and prevent unauthorized system interaction.
  • Insecure Communication Protocols - Legacy systems often use protocols such as Modbus that lack encryption or integrity checking. These protocols can be susceptible to interception, manipulation, or replay attacks.
  • Unsupported or Unpatched Software - Legacy systems may run outdated operating systems, unsupported firmware, or vendor software that no longer receives updates. This creates exposure to known vulnerabilities that cannot easily be remediated.
  • Limited Logging and Visibility - Many legacy systems provide minimal logging capabilities. As a result, organizations may struggle to detect unauthorized changes, investigate incidents, or understand system behavior during an event
  • Flat Network Architectures - Historically, industrial networks were designed for simplicity and reliability, not segmentation. Legacy environments often lack network zoning, firewalls between systems, and a clear separation between IT and OT. This allows threats to move more easily across the environment.

Operational Consequences of Cyber Risk

In food manufacturing, cybersecurity incidents are not confined to digital systems. They translate into physical and operational consequences, such as:

  • production downtime
  • incorrect processing parameters
  • equipment damage
  • refrigeration failures
  • product spoilage
  • traceability gaps

In some cases, these issues can escalate into regulatory action, product recalls, and reputational damage. The presence of legacy systems increases the likelihood that a cyber event can propagate into these outcomes.

Managing Risk Without Replacing Everything

Replacing all legacy systems is rarely practical. Instead, organizations must focus on risk management strategies that allow these systems to operate safely within modern environments.

  • Network Segmentation - Segmenting networks into zones (as defined by ISA/IEC62443) is one of the most effective controls. This includes separating IT and OT networks, isolating critical control systems, and limiting communication pathways between systems. Segmentation helps prevent threats from spreading across the environment.
  • Secure Remote Access - Remote access should be tightly controlled. Best practices include using secure gateways instead of direct connections, implementing multi-factor authentication, limiting access to specific systems and time windows, and monitoring all remote sessions
  • Compensating Controls - Where legacy systems cannot be secured directly, compensating controls can reduce risk. Examples include external firewalls protecting legacy devices, intrusion detection systems monitoring network traffic, and application control on supporting systems.
  • Monitoring and Visibility - Improving visibility is critical. Organizations should implement centralized logging where possible, use network monitoring tools, and introduce anomaly detection for unusual system behavior. This allows earlier detection of potential issues.
  • Configuration and Change Management - Strict control over system changes reduces the risk of both insider threats and unintended errors. This includes documented procedures for system modifications, approval workflows for changes, and validation of updates before deployment.

The Human Factor

Legacy systems are often supported by a small number of experienced individuals who understand how they operate. This creates both strength and vulnerability. While these individuals provide critical expertise, reliance on informal knowledge can lead to:

  • inconsistent practices
  • undocumented changes
  • difficulty maintaining security controls

Training and documentation are essential to ensure that knowledge is shared and systems are managed consistently.

Looking Forward

Food manufacturers face a fundamental challenge: balancing the need for operational reliability with the need for modern cybersecurity protections. Legacy systems are often highly reliable. But without appropriate safeguards, they can become entry points for cyber threats that disrupt operations and compromise product integrity. The goal is not to eliminate legacy systems, but to integrate them safely into a secure architecture.

As the food industry continues to digitize, the gap between legacy systems and modern cybersecurity expectations will continue to widen. Organizations that proactively address these challenges will be better positioned to:

  • maintain production continuity
  • protect food safety
  • meet regulatory expectations
  • strengthen supply chain resilience

Legacy control systems may be part of the past, but how they are managed will play a critical role in the future of food manufacturing.

About the leader

Steve Mustard
Steve Mustard
President & CEO

Steve Mustard is an industrial automation consultant with more than 35 years of engineering experience across multiple sectors. He is a licensed Professional Engineer (PE) in Texas and Kansas, a Liveryman of the Worshipful Company of Engineers, an ISA Certified Automation Professional® (CAP®), a UK registered Chartered Engineer (CEng), a European registered Engineer (Eur Ing), a GIAC Global Industrial Cyber Security Professional (GICSP), and a Certified Mission Critical Professional (CMCP). He was the 2021 President of the International Society of Automation (ISA) and is a Life Fellow of the Society. He is a Fellow of the Institution of Engineering and Technology, and a member of the Water Environment Federation (WEF) Safety and Security Committee. Mustard writes and presents on a wide array of technical topics and is the author of “Industrial Cybersecurity, Case Studies and Best Practices” and ‘Mission Critical Operations Primer”, both published by ISA and “A Guide to Cybersecurity for Water and Wastewater Utilities”, published by WEF. He has also contributed to other technical books, including “Project Management: A Technician’s Guide”, published by ISA, WEF’s “Design of Water Resource Recovery Facilities, Manual of Practice No.8, Sixth Edition” and “The Digital Twin” book., published by Springer Nature. Mustard’s previous and current client list includes: the UK Ministry of Defence; NATO; major utilities, such as Anglian Water Services and Sydney Water Corporation; major oil and gas companies, such as bp, BG Group and Shell; Fortune 500 companies, such as Quintiles Laboratories; and other leading organizations.

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